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Steve Klein & Andrea Barton Reeves
Brief Statement and Procedural History of the Case
Julie McCoy, the Petitioner, is forty-seven years old and is a
twenty-year law-enforcementveteran. Ms. McCoy left the Wagner City
Police Department in September 1995 to take a teaching position as an
Assistant Professor of Criminology at Puerta Pacific College's School of
Criminal Justice (the "College"), a private institution and Respondent in
this case. In 1991, the College experienced a significant downturn in
applications and student enrollment. As this trend continued, the
College was forced to lay off 250 members of its faculty and staff.
Although the College has been able to increase its hiring in recent years,
the College's Board of Trustees unanimously voted in January 1994 to
create a two-part financial plan, known as the "Profit Plan," to better
secure the College's financial future. Part One of the Plan consists of an
endowment fund with a goal to raise $5 million dollars by the year 2000.
Part Two of the Plan includes a salary structure that links years of
experience to salaries paid to newly hired professors. According to the
Plan, new professors are hired at a point no higher than Step 2 of the
salary structure, at which a professor with a maximum of five years
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experience in teaching or law enforcement and holding a bachelor's
degree is paid no more than $28,000 per year for the first year of
employment.
The salary structure is incorporated in a collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") between the College and the American Union of
College Professors ("AUCP"). AUCP has represented the faculty and
staff at the College only since August 1994, when the Union won its
election by five votes. The CBA covers all faculty employed by the
College, including tenured and non-tenured professors. The collective
bargaining agreement also includes an arbitration clause that explicitly
requires that statutory rights disputes be submitted to arbitration and that
the arbitrator's decision is binding on all parties.'
Ms. McCoy was hired at a salary of $53,000, well in excess of
the $28,000 cap set by the Profit Plan, but in keeping with the salary
paid to professors with Ms. McCoy's extensive law-enforcement
experience. Although Ms. McCoy began to teach classes, the College
continued to look for a candidate to fill the position of Assistant
Professor of Criminology. In October 1995, the College hired Vicki
Stubing, twenty-eight, as an Assistant Professor of Criminology, at a
salary of $28,000 per year. Ms. Stubing had two years experience as a
patrol officer with the Puerto Vallarta Police Department and held a
bachelor's degree in criminal justice. Citing Part Two of the Profit Plan,
' Article 47 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement reads as follows:
1. All disputes not settled pursuant to any grievance procedure provided
for herein shall, at the request of either party, be referred to final and
binding arbitration.
2. The parties expressly agree that the arbitrator shall have jurisdiction
to decide any claims that a party has violated any federal, state or local
anti-discrimination statute, including, without limitation, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
3. The arbitrator's decision, in all disputes submitted to arbitration,
shall be final and binding upon both parties as to all issues.
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the College terminated Ms. McCoy when it hired Ms. Stubing.
AUCP brought a grievance on behalf of Ms. McCoy, alleging
that the Profit Plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). The grievance contended that the
Profit Plan discriminates against professors with experience similar to
Ms. McCoy's, most of whom would be over forty. The case was heard
by an arbitrator, Isaac Washington, who decided that disparate impact,
a theory of liability that prohibits employers from adopting facially
neutral employment practices that disproportionately disadvantage a
legally protected class (such as women or persons of color), is not a
viable theory under the ADEA. He thus denied Ms. McCoy's claim for
reinstatement and back pay.
Ms. McCoy then sued the College in the United States District
Court for the District of Wagner. The action, brought under the ADEA,
alleged that the binding arbitration clause of the collective bargaining
agreement was not enforceable. She also contended that the College's
Profit Plan violates the ADEA because it has a disparate impact on older
workers. The district court held that the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement did not bar Ms. McCoy from bringing an ADEA
action in federal court. The court also held that disparate impact is a
viable claim under the ADEA, but found that the College's Profit Plan
was justified as a business necessity. The College appealed, and Ms.
McCoy cross-appealed, to the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth
Circuit, which held that the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case because Ms. McCoy was bound by the arbitrator's decision,
pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the
College and AUCP. The United States Supreme Court granted Ms.
McCoy's petition for certiorari to decide two issues: (1) whether a
union's agreement to submit statutory employment discriminationclaims
to binding arbitration is enforceable; and (2) whether disparate impact
liability should be recognized under the ADEA, and if so, whether the
College's practice is justified by business necessity.
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Overview of Issue # 1: Binding Arbitration
IS A UNION'S AGREEMENT, AS PART OF A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
REQUIRING BARGAINING UNIT MEMBERS TO
SUBMIT STATUTORY RIGHTS DISPUTES TO
BINDING ARBITRATION, ENFORCEABLE?
The first issue is whether the Petitioner, Julie McCoy, was
entitled to bring a statutory rights employment discrimination action in
federal court after her case was decided by an arbitrator who ruled
against her.
Summary of the Law
This issue presents the United States Supreme Court with a
narrow issue it has yet to resolve. In two landmark cases, the Court
considered contractual requirements to arbitrate employment
discriminationclaims. See Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver 415 U.S. 36,
56 (1974) (holding binding arbitration inappropriate where collective
bargaining agreement did not include requirement for arbitration of
statutory rights); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
23 (1991) (holding. binding arbitration appropriate when employee's
individual agreement requires binding arbitration of statutory rights
claims). The competitors will have to distinguish the two cases, arguing
why the case that best supports their position is more applicable than the
other.
This issue also turns heavily on policy arguments. The
competitors should explain why binding arbitration of statutory claims
in the collective bargaining context is either desirable or undesirable.
This argument will also necessarily include a discussion about the
Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994), and
whether the FAA does, or should, apply to binding arbitration in the
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collective bargaining context. Consequently, this section also includes
an overview of the FAA as it applies to this case.
The Arbitration Clause
The competitors must be familiar with the wording of the
arbitration clause.6 It is imperative that the competitors understand that
the clause explicitly requires that statutory rights disputes be submitted
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to decrease the incessant backlog of cases
to be adjudicated and to make courts more tolerant of arbitration as an alternative means
of dispute resolution. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir.
1995). The FAA directs federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements. See Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
6 The pertinent sections of the arbitration agreement read as follows:
ARTICLE 21
2. All parties hereto shall comply with all federal, state, and local statutes and
regulations proscribing discrimination.
(a) In addition to those forms of discrimination addressed by
said statutes and regulations, the parties hereto expressly agree
not to discriminate, in any manner, against any person, on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, age, national origin, physical
or mental handicap, or sexual orientation ....
ARTICLE 47
1. All disputes not settled pursuant to any grievance procedure provided for herein
shall, at the request of either party, be referred to final and binding arbitration.
2. The parties expressly agree that the arbitrator shall have jurisdiction to decide
any claims that a party has violated any federal, state or local anti-discrimination
statute, including, without limitation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
3. The arbitrator'sdecision, in all disputes submitted to arbitration, shall be final
and binding upon both parties as to all issues.
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to binding arbitration.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of arbitration in the
collective bargaining context in Gardner-Denver The Court considered
whether a unionized employee may pursue a race-discrimination claim
brought by an employee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in federal court after the employee loses on a similar claim before an
arbitrator. 415 U.S. at 42. Title VII was enacted to address employment
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (1994). The employee's union had submitted a
claim to binding arbitration that Alexander's discharge violated the
collective bargaining agreement's prohibition of race discrimination, and
the employee lost. 415 U.S. at 42. However, in Gardner-Denver the
Title VII claim was not submitted to the arbitrator; rather, the arbitrator
heard a breach of contract claim. Id. After the arbitration,the employee
filed a Title VII action against the employer in federal court. Id. The
employer argued that the employee was barred from bringing the action
because, the employee contended, the collective bargaining agreement
that governed the employee's employment had a binding arbitration
clause. Id.
The Court disagreed with the employer, noting that the
arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement did not include
statutory rights, unlike the arbitration clause in the College's collective
bargaining agreement. See 415 U.S. at 39-40. Rather, the arbitration
clause in Gardner-Denver provided only for the binding arbitration of
contractual questions. Id. at 37. As such, the Court held that the
arbitrator did not have the authority to determine statutory rights
disputes. Id.
The Court also based its decision on what it considered to be
clear congressional intent. Specifically, the Court determined that
Congress had long demonstrated an intent to "accord parallel or
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overlapping remedies against discrimination." Id. at 47.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Seventeen years after deciding Gardner-Denver the Supreme
Court heard Gilmer. In Gilmer, a financial services manager not
represented by a union brought an age discrimination claim under the
ADEA. 500 U.S. at 23. As a condition of his employment, Gilmer
signed a broker's registration agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange. Id. This agreement contained an arbitration clause that
required him to submit statutory discrimination claims to arbitration. Id.
The claimant bypassed this requirement, however, bringing suit in
federal court instead. Id. He asserted that arbitral fora are inappropriate
for resolving statutory claims of discrimination. Id. The Supreme Court
rejected his argument, recognizing that "it is by now clear that statutory
claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement." Id. at 26. The
Court also found nothing in either the text or legislative history of the
ADEA that would preclude binding arbitration. Id. at 24. Thus,
although Gilmer did not involve a collective bargaining agreement, it is
pertinent here in two key respects. First, like the Petitioner in Gilmer,
Ms. McCoy brought her claim under the ADEA. Second, like the
contract here, the contract in Gilmer contained explicit language
requiring that statutory rights be arbitrated.
Another key component of the Gilmer opinion was the majority's
reliance on the FAA. The Court noted that the FAA manifested a
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id. at 25 (citing
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)). As such, the Court held that "[i]t is by now clear that statutory
claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable
pursuant to the FAA." Id. at 26. It is important to note, however, that
the majority never decided whether the FAA applies to employment
contracts. The majority determined that, because Gilmer included a
securities registration agreement-not an employment contract-and
88519971
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because plaintiff did not raise the issue below, FAA analysis was not
necessary. Id. at 25 n.2.
Gilmer is also notable for Justice Stevens's dissent, which
focused on the FAA,7 in which Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
relying on the FAA. See id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically,
Justice Stevens cited to the drafters of the FAA and argued that the FAA
was "not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is
purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting
down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they
want to do it." Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting Chairman of the
American Bar Association committee responsible for drafting the bill
before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th
Sess., 9 (1923)). Therefore, Justice Stevens argued, the FAA and the
policy considerations underlying the FAA are not applicable to cases,
such as Gilmer, that are based on employment contracts.
The majority of lower courts have disagreed with Justice
Stevens, however, concluding instead that the FAA does apply to
employment contracts. See, e.g. Pietro Scalzitti Constr. Co. v.
International Union of Operating Eng'rs., Local No. 150, 351 F.2d 576,
580 (7th Cir. 1965); DeCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F.
Supp. 947, 952 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). These courts have held that the
employment contract exception to the FAA, which provides that the
7 The relevant section of the FAA reads as follows:
Section 1. ['C]ommerce',as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any
Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
or between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or foreign nation, but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
9 U.S.C. § I (1994) (emphasis added).
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FAA should not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or workers engaged in interstate commerce," 9 U.S.C. § I
(1994), does not extend to employees not directly engaged in interstate
commerce. Pietro, 351 F.2d at 579; DeCrisci 807 F. Supp. at 952.
The competitors must understand that Gilmer did not simply
ignore Gardner-Denver. Instead, the Gilmer Court discussed Gardner-
Denver in depth and distinguished it from Gilmer. See 500 U.S. at 33-
34. Specifically,the Court noted that Gardner-Denver "did not involve
the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims. Rather, [it] involved the quite different issue 'of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims." Id. at 35. In addition, the Court noted
that Gardner-Denver and its progeny were not decided under the FAA
and were thus inapplicable to Gilmer. Id. Moreover, the Court
distinguished Gilmer from Gardner-Denver to the extent that Gardner-
Denver was a collective bargaining case and Gilmer was not. Id. at 34-
35. The Court stated that different considerations may apply in the
unionized context because of the potential disparity of interest between
unions and individual employees. Id. at 35. Thus, the Court in Gilmer
explicitly stated that it was not overruling Gardner-Denver. Id.
The Lower Court Cases
The majority of the lower courts that have considered the
arbitration issue have held that collective bargaining agreements cannot
require binding arbitration of statutory rights. See, e.g. Bolden v.
SEPT. 953 F.2d 807, 811 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a union may not
make agreements with an employer to require binding arbitration of
statutory rights disputes); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys. 847 F.
Supp. 1232, 1241 (D.N.J. 1994) (same); Hull v. NCR Corp. 826 F.
Supp. 303, 308 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (same); Sewell v. New York City
Transit Auth., 809 F. Supp. 208, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (same). Each
of these cases is distinguishable from the case at bar, however, because
19971 887
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none of them included explicit contractual requirements for binding
arbitration of statutory rights.
I The Fourth Circuit, however, has recently held that requiring
binding arbitration of statutory rights against discrimination is
permissible in the collective bargaining context. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because "unions may waive the right [of individuals] to
strike and other rights," there is no reason why unions may not similarly
waive statutory rights to have discrimination claims heard in court. See
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996) (relying on Gilmer), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996). Austin
is particularly applicable to this case because of the factual similarity.
In fact, the contractual language contained in the fact pattern was
modelled closely after the contractual language at issue in Austin.
Several relevant district court cases have also been decided since
Gilmer and Austin. Those courts are split as to whether the Fourth
Circuit correctly construed Gilmer in Austin. For example, this past
November, the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
considered a Title VII claim of an employee governed by a collective
bargaining agreement that contained a binding arbitration clause. See
Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. No. CS-95-0174-WFN,
1996 WL 764906, at * 1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 1996). The Baker court,
citing Austin, held that Gilmer had rejected the primary concern of
Gardner-Denver: "that arbitration is an inappropriate forum to resolve-
Title VII statutory rights." Id.
Two recent cases, both decided by the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, also relied on Austin to preclude litigation
after arbitration of statutory rights disputes. See Bright v. Norshipco.
No. 2:96CV985, 1997 WL 35519, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 1997);
Rudolph v. Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. No. CIV.A 2:96CV732, 1997 WL
35520, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan 28, 1997). Of course, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia is within the Fourth Circuit and, thus, is
bound by Austin.
In contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
decided a case on February 4, 1997, in which the claimant sued under
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the Americans with Disabilities Act despite a binding arbitration clause
in the Teamster's collective bargaining agreement. See Baert v. Euclid
Beverage Ltd. No. 95 C 7196, 1997 WL 51682, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4,
1997). Although the Baert court cited to Austin, it ultimately rejected
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, determining instead that Gilmer left
Gardner-Denver at least partially intact. Id. at *3. In reaching this
conclusion, the Baert court noted that the arguments in both Gilmer and
Austin in favor of statutory rights arbitration were "persuasive." Id.
However, the court noted that because the Gilmer Court had taken
"pains to distinguish Alexander... there is enough life left in Alexander
to bind a federal district court." Id. (relying on Khan v. State Oil Co. 93
F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Summary of the Argument
(a) Petitioner's Argument
Petitioner will argue that the District Court for the District of
Wagner had jurisdiction to hear Ms. McCoy's case. Petitioner must
argue that her union did not have the right, given Gardner-Denver and
its progeny, to require her to submit her dispute to binding arbitration
and that Ms. McCoy herself did not have the right or power to determine
whether or not to arbitrate-the union made the decision to arbitrate and
forced her to do so.
It is also important that the Petitioner understand that this is a
"must win" or threshold issue. If the Court determines that the
arbitration was acceptably binding, the question whether the College
discriminated against Ms. McCoy will never be reached and, thus, the
arbitration decision against Petitioner will stand.
The binding arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement presented in this case was purposely written in explicit,
unambiguous language, like in Austin. Although Petitionermay attempt
to argue that the arbitration language in the collective bargaining
19971 889
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agreement has loopholes, this is really a non-issue. The Petitioner
should be willing to concede that the collective bargaining agreement is
clear and unambiguous.
Petitioner should argue that relying on Gilmer is inappropriate
because the arbitration clause in Gilmer was not part of an employment
contract but part of a stock exchange registration agreement. Thus,
Petitioner may argue that the pro-arbitration FAA applied in G ilmer, but
not here. This is not a clear-cut argument, however. It is true that the
Gilmer contract, which included the requirement to arbitrate statutory
rights, was between Gilmer and the New York Stock Exchange.
However, Gilmer's employer required him to sign that contract as a
prerequisite to hiring him. Thus, the collective bargaining agreement
has many of the characteristics of an employment contract.
Petitioner may also argue that even though arbitration is often a
positive alternative to litigation, the FAA purposely excluded
employment contracts because of the peculiarities in the employer-
employee relationship. This is a rather tenuous argument--one that
lower-court case law heavily contradicts. However, as noted in the
"Overview" section above, the majority of the Supreme Court in Gilmer
did not reach this issue, and Justice Stevens made that argument in his
dissent in Gilmer, relying on the chairman of the FAA drafting
committee.
Petitioner also should make several policy arguments. First, as
suggested above, Petitioner can argue that there is an inherent unfairness
about the employee's lack of involvement in the decision to arbitrate the
discrimination claim. Petitionermay argue that the disadvantage to her
as an employee is particularly significant because unions, by nature,
seek contract terms that would benefit the majority of the members of
the bargaining unit.
The argument that union agreements to arbitrate disadvantage
the employee is rebuttable. It is quite conceivable that employees
receive more protection when binding arbitration clauses are negotiated
by experienced, knowledgeable union representatives than when
employees negotiate contracts individually.
890 [Vol. XIII
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Petitioner should also argue that Congress has long demonstrated
an intent to "accord parallel or overlapping remedies against
discrimination." Gardner-Denver 415 U.S. at 47 (citing Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). Petitioner should argue that when it comes to
issues as important as discrimination, especially when it affects one's
livelihood, more scrutiny is preferable to less.
(b) Respondent's Argument
Respondent will argue that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to hear Ms. McCoy's case. Specifically, Respondent must
argue that (1) Ms. McCoy's union had the authority to agree to binding
arbitration on her behalf; (2) this case is distinguishable from Gardner-
Denver and that Gilmer is more applicable; and (3) the FAA and public
policy favor arbitrating statutory rights claims.
Respondent should argue that the union had the authority to
agree to arbitrate Ms. McCoy's claim. Moreover, Respondent should
assert that unions make important decisions to waive members' rights all
the time. For example, unions are allowed to waive their members'
rights to strike. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885.
- 1 Respondent should also argue that allowing unions to have the
authority to waive the right to sue the employer poses no danger. If the
union fails to represent an employee fairly, the employee can sue the
union for failure to provide fair representation. However, only five
percent of such "duty of fair representation" claims ever succeed.
Respondent should rely heavily on Austin and its progeny to
argue that Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver-at least implicitly-and,
thus, that Gardner-Denver is not applicable here. To succeed in this
argument, Respondent must also down play the parts of Gilmer that cut
against Respondent's argument. For example, Respondent should argue
that the extent of Gilmer's discussion about collective bargaining
agreements expressed that an individual's interests may be subordinated
19971 891
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to those of the collective bargaining unit. 500 U.S. at 35. Respondent
should argue that this was merely dicta and that the Court left for
another day a full analysis of whether binding arbitration is appropriate
in the collective bargaining context.
Respondent should also argue that Gardner-Denver is
inapplicable here because the collective bargaining agreement in
Gardner-Denver did not explicitly call for binding arbitration of
statutory rights and, thus, that statutory rights determinations are beyond
the jurisdiction of an arbitrator.
Finally, Respondent should argue that even if the Court
determines that Gilmer is not sufficiently similar to the case at bar,
Austin is similar, and, therefore, that the Court should consider the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Austin persuasive.
Respondent should argue that arbitrating statutory rights makes
sense in terms of social policy. The premise for this argument should be
the Federal Arbitration Act. Respondent should argue that the FAA
favors arbitration, even in the employment setting, with few exceptions.
Moreover, Respondent must be able to argue that Justice Stevens was
incorrect in his dissent in Gilmer that the exclusion clause of the FAA
relates to all employment contracts. Respondent may also argue that the
Court should adopt an expansive attitude toward arbitration, specifically
as it relates to statutory rights disputes due to the growing docket of such
cases on the courts. Respondent may also suggest that arbitratioh'is-a-
beneficial method of alternative dispute resolution: that it is cheaper,
faster, less burdensome, and just as fair as litigating in court.
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Overview of Issue #2: Disparate Impact Claim
SHOULD DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY BE
RECOGNIZED UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, 29
U.S.C. § 623 (1994) AND, IF SO, HAS
RESPONDENT SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING
BUSINESS NECESSITY?
In deciding this issue, this Court must determine whether
disparate impact is a viable theory under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and if so, whether the College's Profit Plan
is nonetheless justified as a business necessity.
Summary of the Law
Courts have long recognized disparate impact claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), the
statute that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.
424, 430 (1971). The circuits are split, however, as to whether disparate
impact analysis applies to ADEA cases. In Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit held that a teacher who
challenges a school district's hiring plan could prevail under a disparate
impact theory of discrimination. Similarly, in Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State College. 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit
upheld the district court's finding that the Defendant's selection plan for
tenured professors "had a disparate impact on employees protected by
the ADEA." Id.
On the other hand, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
608 (1993), the Supreme Court held that petitioner did not violate the
ADEA when it fired an older worker before his retirement benefits had
vested. The Court noted that the ADEA was designed primarily to
19971 893
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prevent older workers from being deprived of employment opportunities
based on "inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes" about their
productivity. Id. at 610. The Court, however, declined to decide
whether disparate impact applies to the ADEA because Respondent
raised only a disparate treatment claim. The dicta in Hazen Paper has
been interpreted to mean that the Supreme Court disfavors applying the
disparate impact theory of liability to the ADEA, because there is no
stereotyping problem in disparate impact cases. See EEOC v. Francis
W. Parker Sch. 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Relying on the
Court's holding in Hazen Paper, the Seventh Circuit decided in Francis
W. Parker Sch. that a private school had not violated the ADEA when
it refused to hire a sixty-three-year-old teacher because his potential
salary, if paid according to the school's policy of paying teachers a salary
commensurate with their experience, exceeded the school's budget. 41
F.3d at 1078.
Congress has not directly addressed the issue of disparate impact
liability under the ADEA. In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights of
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)), to reinstate disparate impact analysis
under Title VII after it had been significantly eroded by the Supreme
Court's holding in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
660 (1989). Although Congress made great efforts to reinstate disparate
impact liability under Title VII, it made no attempt to amend the ADEA
to authorize disparate impact liability specifically.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
persons forty or older when making employment-related decisions. See
29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). The statute clearly prohibits employment
decisions made out of animus to older workers or stereotypes about
them. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc. 828 F.2d 1202, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987).
The issue in this competition is whether the ADEA also prohibits
894 [Vol. XIII
WAGNER BENCH BRIEF
facially neutral employmentpractices that effectively disadvantage older
workers.
Disparate Impact
The disparate impact theory of discrimination allows a person
protected by an anti-discrimination statute to prove that an employer's
facially neutral employment practice (an employment practice that is not
designed to discriminate against a protected class) has a discriminatory
effect on a protected class. Disparate impact has been recognized as
viable theory against discriminationin Title VII cases. See. e.g., Griggs
401 U.S. at 430.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff
must prove that an employer's challenged practice has a significantly
disparate impact on a protected class. Id. An employee may establish
disparate impact by presenting statistics that show that the employer's
practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected class. Id. If a court
finds that an employer's practice discriminates against a protected class,
an employer may defend its practice by showing a fact-finder that the
practice is justified as a business necessity. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co..
No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831, at *2 (1st Cir. July 14, 1995).
Summary of the Argument
(a) Petitioner's Argument
The main point of contention between the College and Ms.
McCoy is whether disparate impact is a viable claim under the ADEA.
Petitioner will make several arguments to persuade this Court to find
disparate impact a viable theory under ADEA. Petitioner will argue that
Title VII served as a model for the ADEA and mirrors much of Title
1997] 895
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VII's language regarding unlawful discrimination.' These similarities,
Petitioner will contend, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended
that disparate impact applies to the ADEA as it applies to Title VII.
Petitioner will also argue that the ADEA's legislative history
proves that Congress intended that disparate impact claims be permitted
under the ADEA. Petitioner will assert that since Congress intended that
Title VII and the ADEA accomplish the same goal of eradicating
discrimination in the workplace, Congress must have intended that the
same causes of action be available under the ADEA and Title VII.
Petitioner will distinguish this case from Hazen Paper by arguing that
the Court in Hazen Paper never held that disparate impact is not a viable
theory under the ADEA; the Court stated only that it would not decide
an issue not before the Court. Id. at 609.
Furthermore, Petitioner should also argue that Congress's
decision not to amend the ADEA to include disparate impact liability
should not be interpreted to mean that the theory is inapplicable to the
ADEA. Petitioner may assert that Congress's failure to alter a statute
after courts have interpreted it may mean that the courts' construction of
the statute is accurate. See Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 472
(1940). In Geller and Leftwich. the courts applied disparate impact
analysis to the ADEA, and Congress has not yet acted to amend the
statute to exclude disparate impact specifically.
Petitioner must argue that Respondent's Profit Plan is
discriminatory and may not be defended under § 623(f) of the ADEA.
Section 623(f) of the ADEA permits an employer to raise several
' Section 623(a)(2) of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2) (1994). Similarly, §
2000e-2(a)(2) of Title VII reads: "It shall be unlawful for an employer (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994).
896 [Vol. XIII
WA GNER BENCH BRIEF
statutory defenses to an age discrimination claim. One of the most
commonly raised defenses is known as the reasonable factors other than
age (RFOA) defense. This defense allows an employer to prove that its
employment decisions are based on reasonable factors independent of
an employee's age. See Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and
the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 837, 854 n.80 (1982).
Reasonable factors other than age may include a decrease in staff due to
layoffs, budget constraints, or poor performance. Petitioner will argue
that Ms. McCoy was fired because she was an older, more experienced
professor and that none of the reasonable factors recognized by other
courts are applicable in this case.
Petitioner must also argue that Respondent's employment
practice is not justified as a business necessity. An employment practice
is justified when an employer can demonstrate to a court that the
challenged employment practice is consistent with business necessity.
Ward's Cove 420 U.S. at 656. Here, Petitioner will contend that the
Profit Plan no longer serves Respondent's business goals of avoiding
future layoffs and securing the College's financial future. Petitionerwill
argue that the College has been financially sound over the past three
years as evidenced by its ability to hire new professors and reopen a
previously closed degree program. (R. at 16.).
Petitionerwill also argue that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does
not preclude applying disparate impact to the ADEA. Petitioner may
assert that the primary purpose of the ADEA was to reinstate the
employer's burden of persuasion to show that a challenged business
practice was essential to the business. The employer's burden of proof
in disparate impact cases had been significantly reduced by the Supreme
Court's holding in Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 648. In that case, the Court
required that plaintiff rebut the business necessity defense by showing
that the practice did not serve a legitimate business goal. See Theodore
McMillian,Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991-One Step Forward on
A Long Road. 22 Stetson L. Rev. 69, 71 (1992). Furthermore, Petitioner
will argue that the compromises made to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1991 do not mean that certain causes of action should not be recognized
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under the ADEA. Petitionermay argue that Congress intentionally left
open the question whether disparate impact may apply to the ADEA.
This lack of direction by Congress, however, should not be construed to
mean that disparate impact is not applicable to the ADEA.
Finally, Petitioner should argue that where Congress does not
explicitly state its intent for the construction and application of a statute,
this Court should defer to the administrative agency, in this case, the
EEOC. Chevron, U.S.A.. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The EEOC has found disparate impact a
cognizable claim under the ADEA. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 690.
(b) Respondent's Argument
Respondentwill argue disparate impact should not be recognized
under the ADEA. Contendingthat Ms. McCoy was terminated because
her salary was too high and not because she was too old for the job,
Respondent will rely heavily on this Court's reasoning in Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 608. In that case, this Court noted that the ADEA is
designed to prohibit inaccurate stereotyping of older workers, not to
address all employment practices that affect older workers. Id. This
Court observed in Hazen Paper that "[w]hen the employer's decision is
wholly motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate
and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the
motivating factor is correlated with age." Id. at 610. Similarly, in this
case, Respondent will argue that the Profit Plan does not inaccurately
stereotype older workers. In fact, Respondent may assert that the Profit
Plan acknowledges that experienced professors should be paid
considerably more than less seasoned professors. However, according
to the Respondent, the College's decision to terminate Ms. McCoy is
based solely on the fact that her salary exceeds that College's budget
constraints and that age played no role in the College's decision.
Respondent will also argue that Congress's modeling the ADEA
after Title VII is not a sufficient reason for this Court to find that
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disparate impact applies to the ADEA. Although Respondent should
concede that the ADEA is modeled after Title VII, see Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978), Respondent should also assert that some
courts have noted that the correct reading of § 623(a)(2) of the ADEA
only "prohibit[s] limiting, segregating, or classifying employees"
because of age, and does not permit a disparate impact claim to be raised
under the ADEA. See Evan Pontz, What a Difference ADEA Makes:
Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 289 (1995)
(noting that § (4)(a)(2) of the ADEA should be read to "prohibit limiting,
segregating or classifying employees because of age, which authorizes
only a disparate treatment claim"); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp_. 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the statutory
language [of the ADEA] does not explicitly provide for disparate impact
liability").
Respondent will also point out that there is no articulated
congressional intent to support finding disparate impact theory applies
to the ADEA. See id. at 732. When legislative intent is unclear or
unarticulated,the Court should refrain from substituting its judgment for
that of the legislature. See Lorillard, 424 U.S. at 585 (."We are not
unmindful of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent where the
statute provides no express answer.")
In addition to the policy arguments that Respondent should
make, Respondent should also argue that under the ADEA, it may raise
the statutory defense of reasonable factors other than age. Here, the
College will assert that Ms. McCoy was terminated because her salary
exceeded that paid to any new professor, regardless of age. Although
Ms. McCoy's starting salary was based on her experience, which in this
case may correlate with her age, the decision to not pay any new
professor more than $32,000 is independent of any discriminatory
differentiation between younger and older professors. Respondent
should assert that the Seventh Circuit used similar reasoning in deciding
Francis W. Parker Sch. 41 F.3d at 1076. In that case, the Seventh
Circuit held that a private school did not violate the ADEA when it
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refused to hire a teacher whose salary exceeded the school's budget. Id.
at 1078. The court found that the school's policy of linking wages to
experiences was "[a] ... reasonable means of determining salaries." Id.
Furthermore, the court found the RFOA exception "particularly
noteworthy," noting that the defense suggests that "decisions which are
made for reasons independent of age but which happen to correlate with
age are not actionable under the ADEA." Id. at 1076.
Respondent should concede that if disparate impact is a viable
theory under the ADEA, the Profit Plan has a disparate impact on older
professors. However, Respondent will argue that the Profit Plan is a
lawful practice under the ADEA because it is justified as a business
necessity. Respondent should cite to the record extensively, pointing out
that the Profit Plan was created to secure the College's financial future.
Respondent should also cite to several cases that hold that even in
discrimination claims, courts should not interfere with otherwise sound
business decisions. See, e.g. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.,
670 F.2d 66, 76 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that "[t]he ADEA was not
intended as a vehicle forjudicial review of business decisions"); Abbott
v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that
employer's decision was economic); Stein v. National City Bank, 942
F.2d 1062, 1064 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that court's role is to "ensure that
[business policies] are made on a rational basis," not to determine
propriety of business decisions).
Finally, Respondent should also argue that this Court should not
defer to the EEOC's interpretation, finding that disparate impact applies
to the ADEA. Where Congress has been silent, it is appropriate for this




Issue #1: Binding Arbitration Is Inappropriate In
The Collective Bargaining Context.
Petitioner will argue that the District Court for the District of
Wagner had the jurisdiction to hear Petitioner McCoy's case. Petitioner
must argue that her union did not have the right, given Gardner-Denver
and its progeny, to oblige her to submit her dispute to binding
arbitration. It is crucial to Petitioner's success to argue that McCoy
herself did not have the right or power to determine whether or not to
arbitrate-the union made the decision to arbitrate and forced her to do
SO.
It is also important that the Petitioner understand that this is a
"must win" or threshold issue. If the Court determines that the
arbitration was acceptably binding, the question whether the College
discriminated against Ms. McCoy will never be reached, and thus, the
arbitration decision against Petitioner will stand.
The binding arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement presented in this case was purposely written in explicit,
unambiguous language like in Austin. Although Petitioner may attempt
to argue creatively that the arbitration language in the collective
bargaining agreement has loopholes, this is really a non-issue. Petitioner
should be willing to concede that the collective bargaining agreement is
clear and unambiguous.
Gardner-Denver is More Applicable to this Case than Gilmer
Petitioner must argue that Gardner-Denver is the applicable
precedent here. The Petitioner should argue, for example, that the
claimant in Gardner-Denver, like Ms. McCoy here, was a member of a
collective bargaining unit and, thus, subject to the will of the union.
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The Federal Arbitration Act is Not Applicable
to Employment Contracts
Petitioner should argue that relying on Gilmer is inappropriate
because the arbitration clause in Gilmer was not part of an employment
contract but part of a stock exchange registration agreement. Thus,
Petitioner may argue the pro-arbitration FAA applied in Gilmer, but
does not apply here. This point is not clear-cut. It is true that the Gilmer
contract, which included the requirement to arbitrate statutory rights,
was between Gilmer and the New York Stock Exchange. However,
Gilmer's employer required him to sign that contract as a prerequisite to
hiring him. Thus, a collective bargaining agreement has many of the
characteristics of an employment contract.
Petitioner may argue that even though arbitration is often a
positive alternative to litigation, the FAA purposely excluded
employment contracts because of the peculiarities in the employer-
employee relationship. This argument is rather tenuous-one that
lower-court case law contradicts heavily. However, as noted in the
"Overview" section above, the majority of the Supreme Court in Gilmer
did not reach this issue and Justice Stevens made that argument in his
dissent in Gilmer.
Policy Issues
Petitioner has several policy arguments in her arsenal. First, as
suggested above, Petitioner can argue that there is an inherent unfairness
about the employee's lack of involvement in management and the
union's decision to arbitrate the discrimination claim. Petitioner may
argue that the disadvantage to the employee is particularly significant
because unions, by nature, seek contract terms that would benefit the
majority of the members of the bargaining unit. For example, unions
may agree to arbitration provisions in exchange for management
concessions that would benefit the majority of members at the expense
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of minority members.
The argument that union agreements to arbitrate disadvantage
the employee is rebuttable. It is quite conceivable that employees
receive more protection when binding arbitration clauses are negotiated
by experienced, knowledgeable union representatives than when
employees negotiate contracts individually.
The second key policy argument Petitioner should raise is that
Congress has long demonstrated an intent to "accord parallel or
overlapping remedies against discrimination." Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. at 47 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994);
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). Petitioner should
argue that when it comes to issues as important as discrimination,
especially when they affect one's livelihood, more scrutiny is preferable
to less.
Issue # 2: Disparate Impact Is A Viable Theory Of
Liability Under The ADEA, And The College's Profit
Plan is Not Justified As A Business Necessity Or By
Reasonable Factors Other Than Age.
Disparate Impact Is Applicable To The ADEA
Petitioner should argue that disparate impact is a legitimate
theory of liability under the ADEA. Petitioner must address one or more
of the following arguments:
(a) Title VII and the ADEA share not only similarities in language,
but both statutes were created to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace. Therefore, theories of liability available under Title
VII, particularly disparate impact, must also be available under
the ADEA.
(b) Although this Court in Hazen Paper 507 U.S. at 608, indicated
that the ADEA was designed to prohibit inaccurate stereotypes
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about older workers, this Court's holding does not preclude
finding that disparate impact applies to the ADEA.
(c) Although Congress did not amend the ADEA after it passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress's silence does not mean that
disparate impact should not apply to the ADEA.
Each of these arguments favor applying disparate impact to the ADEA,
although the language-similaritiesargument has the most support in the
case law.
The Profit Plan is Not Justified as a Business Necessity
Petitioner should also argue that Respondent's Profit Plan is not
justified as a business necessity. Petitioner should argue that the College
has been fiscally strong over the past three years and that its Profit Plan
is no longer necessary to maintain the College's financial stability.
RFOA May Not be Raised as a Defense
Petitioner must also assert that Respondent may not rely on the
"reasonable factor other than age" defense. Petitioner should point to the.
Profit Plan and to the statistics cited in the Fact Pattern to show that the
decision to pay new professors a lower salary is not independent of a
candidate's age. Ms. McCoy was terminated because of her age, not
because her salary exceeded the guidelines of the Profit Plan.
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RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
Issue #1: Binding Arbitration Is Appropriate In The
Collective Bargaining Context.
Respondent will argue that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to hear Ms. McCoy's case. To argue this point successfully,
Respondent must convince this Court of three things. First, Respondent
must argue that Ms. McCoy's union had the authority to agree to binding
arbitration on her behalf. Second, Respondent must argue that this case
is distinguishable from Gardner-Denver and that Gilmer is more
applicable. Third, Respondent should argue that the FAA and public
policy favor arbitrating statutory rights claims.
The Union had the Authority to Bind McCoy
to Binding Arbitration
Respondent should argue that the union had the authority to
agree to arbitrate Ms. McCoy's claim. Moreover, Respondent should
assert that unions make important decisions to waive members' rights all
the time. For example, unions are allowed to waive their members'
rights to strike. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885.
Respondent should also argue that allowing unions to have the
authority to waive the right to sue the employer poses no danger. If the
union fails to represent an employee fairly, the employee can sue the
union for failure to provide fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes 386
U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman 345 U.S. 330, 337
(1953); Steele v. Louisville& Nashville Ry.. 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
This argument is rebuttable, however, on the basis that only five percent
of such "duty of fair representation" claims ever succeed. See William
R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than The Workplace
Fairness Act 72 N.C. L. REv. 813, 903 (1994).
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Gilmer is More Applicable to this Case than Gardner-Denver
Respondent should rely heavily on Austin and its progeny to
argue that Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver at least implicitly, and thus
that Gardner-Denver is not applicable here. To succeed in this
argument, Respondent must also downplay the parts of Gilmer that cut
against Respondent's argument. For example, Respondent should argue
that Gilmer's discussion about collective bargaining agreements
expressed only that an individual's interests may be subordinated to
those of the collective bargaining unit. 500 U.S. at 35. Respondent
should argue that this was merely dicta and that the Court left for
another day a full analysis of whether binding arbitration is appropriate
in the collective bargaining context.
Respondent should also argue that Gardner-Denver is
inapplicable here because the collective bargaining agreement in
Gardner-Denver did not explicitly call for binding arbitration of
statutory rights and, thus, that statutory rights determinations are beyond
the jurisdiction of an arbitrator.
Finally, Respondent should argue that even if this Court
determines that Gilmer is not sufficiently similar to the case at bar,
Austin is similar, and therefore, that the Court should consider the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Austin persuasive.
The Federal Arbitration Act is Applicable to
Employment Contracts
Respondent should argue that arbitrating statutory rights makes
sense in terms of social policy. The premise for this argument should be
the FAA. Respondent should argue that the FAA favors arbitration,
even in the employment setting, with few exceptions. Moreover,
Respondent must be able to argue that Justice Stevens was incorrect in
his dissent in Gilmer that the exclusion clause of the FAA relates to all
employment contracts.
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Respondent may also argue that the Court should adopt an
expansive attitude toward arbitration, specifically as it relates to
statutory rights disputes, due to the growing docket of such cases on the
courts. For example, Respondent may argue that, despite the positive
effects of the FAA, namely the trend toward arbitration, the caseload of
statutory disputes arising in the workplace is still increasing. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, is presently facing
a backlog of more than 100,000 employment discriminationclaims. See
In Support of Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes,
NYSBA Labor and Employment Law Section Newsletter (NYSBA/Evan
J. Spelfogel), June 1996, Vol. 21, No. 2. Respondent may also suggest
that arbitration is a great method of alternative dispute resolution: it is
cheaper, faster, less burdensome, and just as fair as resolving disputes in
the courts.
The Arbitrator's Decision was in Manifest Disregard
of the Law
Some Respondents may argue that the arbitrator's decision must
be followed because his decision was not in manifest disregard of the
law. This is an incorrect assertion. The question of manifest disregard
arises only when the arbitrator's decision has been appealed to a court
(i.e., when a court has been asked to review an arbitrator's decision).
Wilko v. Swan. 346 U.S. 427, 429 (1953). Here, McCoy did not bring
an appellate action in the district court; she brought a collateral action.
Thus, the district court reviewed the facts de novo, and the doctrine of
manifest disregard is inapplicable.
Petitioner was Precluded Under the Theory of Res Judicata
from Bringing an Action in District Court
Respondent may also assert a res judicata (claim preclusion)
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argument (and, conversely, Petitioner may argue that it does not apply).
Res judicata is a weak argument. The principle of res judicata is that
once a case has been adjudicated, it should not be revisited. See
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Motie & Brown 452 U.S. 394, 399
(1981). In Federated, this Court held that a claimant is precluded from
bringing an action if (1) the party against whom the preclusive effect is
sought is the same in each action; and (2) the claims are the same. Id.
Thus, Petitioner may argue that the parties seeking preclusion are not the
same-thatthe union, not McCoy, brought the first action. Respondent
may argue that both the parties against whom the preclusive effect is
sought and the claims were the same in the district court action as they
were in the arbitration proceeding and, thus, Petitionerwas procedurally
barred from bringing the district court action.
In any event resjudicata is inappropriate here because it may be
raised only after a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. In other words, res
judicata may not be raised to defend against an arbitrator's decision.
Gardner-Denver 415 U.S. at 49 n.10.
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Issue #2: Disparate Impact Is Not A Viable Theory
Of Liability Under The ADEA, And Even If It Is A
Viable Theory Of Liability Under The ADEA, The
College's Profit Plan Is Justified As a Business
Necessity And By Reasonable Factors Other Than
Age.
Disparate Impact is Not Applicable to the ADEA
Respondent will argue that disparate impact is not applicable to
the ADEA for one or more of the following reasons:
(a) The language similarities between Title VII and the ADEA are
insufficient to find that disparate impact applies to the ADEA.
(b) The ADEA was designed to prohibit inaccurate stereotypes, not
to address all employment practices that affect older workers.
Hazen Paper 507 U.S. at 608 (1993).
(c) No articulated congressional intent supports finding disparate
impact theory applies to the ADEA.
See Leftwic, 702 F.2d at 691 (recognizing disparate impact as a viable
theory to ADEA and finding that College's tenured professor hiring plan
had disparate impact on older professors). Geller, 635 F.2d at 1029
(allowing disparate impact claim and holding that school district's salary
structure had a disparate impact on older, more experienced teachers).
The Profit Plan is Justified as a Business Necessity
Respondent should also argue that although the Profit Plan has
a disparate impact on older professors, the Plan is justified as a business
necessity. Respondent will assert that the College has suffered
significant financial losses in the past and that the Profit Plan is essential
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to the College's future fiscal strength.
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1210 (6th Cir. 1987).
(Respondent should distinguish this case as one of disparate treatment,
not disparate impact.)
RFOA May be Raised as a Defense
Respondent should argue that it may raise the statutory defense
of "reasonable factors other than age." Respondent must analogize this
case to Francis W. Parker Sch. 41 F.3d at 1076, which held that a
private school's policy of linking wages to experience was "[a] ...
reasonable means of determining salaries" and therefore denied back
wages. The Francis W. Parker Sch. court found the RFOA exception
"particularly noteworthy," explaining that an employer's decisions made
independent of age but correlate with age are "not actionable under the
ADEA." Id. at 1076. Here, Respondent will assert that the decision to
terminate McCoy was based solely on her salary and therefore that the
decision was independent of age, as was the'decision in Francis W.
Parker Sch.
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PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE PROFIT PLAN - NEW HIRES
+ $2000 added for all candidates with a Masters Degree
* $4000 added for all candidates with a Ph.D.
Step Candidate Qualifications
less than 2 years teaching experience
in a community college, technical
college, or 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
1-2 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
2 2-4.5 years teaching experience
in a community college, technical
college, or 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
2-3 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
3 5-7 years teaching experience at
a community college, technical
college, or a 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
3-5 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
4 7-9 years teaching experience at a
community college or a.4-year
degree-granting institution OR
5-8 years relevant work experience
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PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE PROFIT PLAN - NEW HIRES
page 2
5 9-1 lyears teaching experience at a
community college or a 4-year
degree-granting institution OR
8-12 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
6 1 1-15 years teaching experience at a
community college or a 4-year degree-
granting institution OR 12-15 years
relevant work experience AND a
Bachelor's Degree
7 15-22 years teaching experience
at a community college or a 4-year
degree-granting institution OR
15-25 years relevant work
experience AND a Bachelor's Degree
8 22-26 years teaching experience
at a community college or a
4-year degree-granting institution
OR 25-35 years relevant work
experience AND a Bachelor's
Degree
43,000 - 47,000
48,000 - 52,000
53,000 - 57,000
58,000 - 62,000
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